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THE CONTINUING FAIR TRADE BATTLE
GEORGE V. COOK -
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE battle over fair trade continues unabated. After the
opponents of fair trade lost the legislative battle with the
enactment of the McGuire Act in the summer of 1952,' it
was only natural for them to turn again to the courts in their
attempt to render fair trade ineffective.
The Supreme Court last year twice refused to review
the Fifth Circuit's decision in the Lilly-Schwegmann. case 2
upholding the constitutionality of fair trade, and has recently
dismissed, for want of substance, appeals which raised sub-
stantially the same questions.3  Since the Lifly-Schwegmann
case, the opponents of fair trade have also embarked on state
by state constitutional attacks and a number of cases have
already reached the highest state courts in several jurisdic-
tions. The highest state courts in Delaware,4 New Jersey '
and New York 6 (as well as lower courts in LouisianaJ
t Member of the New York Bar.
1 See Note, Resale Price Maintenance and the McGuire Act, 27 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 379 (1953).
2 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 109 F. Supp.
269 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856,
rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 905 (1953).
3 See Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d
304 (1954), appeal dismiissed for want of a substantial federal question, October
Term 1954, no. 312, Oct. 25, 1954 (15 CCH Sup. Ct. Bull. 31). See Lionel
Corp. v. S. Klein-on-the-Square, Inc.. 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802 (1954),
cert. denied, October Term 1954, no. 327, Oct. 25, 1954 (15 CCH Sup. Ct. Bull.
32-33); Raxor Corp. v. Goody, 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802 (1954), cert.
denied, October Term 1954, no. 324, Oct. 25, 1954 (15 CCH Sup. Ct. Bull. 33).
4 General Electric Co. v. Klein, 106 A.2d 206 (Del. 1954).
5 Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., supra note 3.
6 General Electric Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802
(1954).
7 See Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super
Markets, CCH TADE RFz. REP. f 67,773 (D.C. La. May 11, 1954).
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Minnesota" and Washington 9 ) have sustained their state
fair trade acts from comprehensive constitutional attacks
since the enactment of the McGuire Act. Meanwhile, the
opponents of fair trade have recently succeeded in upsetting
the non-signer provision of the latest Florida Act,"0 as they
previously did in Georgia," and have obtained similar favor-
able decisions in lower courts in Arkansas,1 2 Nebraska 13
and Utah.,"
Cases are also pending in Idaho, Kentucky, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania and Virginia which may settle the constitutionality
of the fair trade acts in those jurisdictions.
Although a United States District Court recently re-
fused to consider state constitutional objections addressed to
the Arkansas Act until passed on by the highest state court,";
another District Court upheld the Indiana Act 16 against
state as well as federal constitutional objections. The Su-
preme Court of Tennessee, however, refused to apply the
Tennessee Act to interstate transactions in the absence of an
authoritative federal decision interpreting the McGuire Act.17
While the constitutional attacks have received the great-
est attention, the opponents of fair trade have also launched
several statutory attacks which, if successful, could upset
8 See Kautzy v. The Great-Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., unreported
(Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin County, Jan. 1954).
9 See Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Druxman, CCH TRADE CASES 67,498
(Super. Ct. Wash. 1953).
10 Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954). But cf.
Sunbeam Corp. v. Chase & Sherman, Inc., CCH TRADE CAsEs 67,524 (Cir.
Ct. Fla. 1953).
"1 See Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E.2d
161 (1953).
22 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc., CCH
TRADE REG. REr. f[ 67,781 (E.D. Ark. 1954).
"3 General Electric Co. v. Brandeis & Sons, CCH TRADE REG. REP. 67,682
(D. Ct. Neb. 1954).
14 General Electric Co. v. Broadway Merchandising Co., N.Y. Herald
Tribune, Sept. 25, 1954, p. 17, col. 8 (Utah D. Ct. 1954).
IS Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc., 118
F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Ark. 1954); cf. Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Barrett, 213 F.2d
776 (5th Cir. 1954).
16The Sherwin Williams Co. v. Bargain Barns, Inc., CCH TRADE REG.
REP. 1167,697 (S.D. Ind. 1954).
17 Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Robilio, CCH TRADE REG. REP. 67,540 (Sup.
Ct. Tenn. 1953). Such an authoritative decision has of course been provided
by the Lilly case and the other recent cases.
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the effectiveness of particular fair trade acts or fair trade in
general as readily as any constitutional defect.
Fair traders, for example, have recently noted expanded
competition in the use of trading stamps, give-aways, com-
bination sales and in prescription products, particularly in
those jurisdictions where these practices are not specifically
prohibited by statute.' 8 So, too, there has been greater resort
to interstate mail order sales originating in both fair trade
and non-fair trade jurisdictions to test the statutory, as well
as constitutional, applicability of fair trade to such sales. 9
Perhaps most significant, however, is the renewed legis-
lative attack which fair trade is beginning to feel. Fair trade
publications have already noted with concern the report that
the Attorney General's Committee will recommend the repeal
of the McGuire Act.20
Finally, fair traders have also been confronted by multi-
farious equitable and anti-trust defenses in enforcement pro-
ceedings which pose for many manufacturers the problem of
finding means of enforcement at a cost not prohibitive.21
II. THE HISTORY OF FAIR TRADE
The significance of the recent constitutional attacks and
attempts to render fair trade ineffective cannot be fully ap-
preciated without a background of the legal history of resale
price maintenance of which fair trade is merely a particular
form.
Is See F-D-C REPORTS (March 13, 1954 and May 8, 1954) (a trade publica-
tion for the drug and cosmetics industry).
19 Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 67,841 (S.D. N.Y.
1954); General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 122 F. Supp. 797
(S.D. N.Y. 1954); Sunbeam Corp. v. MacMillan, 110 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md.
1953); see Raxor Corp. v. Goody, 307 N.Y. 229, 240, 120 N.E.2d 802, 805
(1954), cert. denied, October Term 1954, no. 324, Oct. 25, 1954 (15 CCH Sup.
Ct. Bull. 33).
20 See F-D-C REPORTS (Aug. 21, 1954). The economic arguments for and
against fair trade have been set forth previously. See Note, Resale Price
Maintenance and the McGuire Act, 27 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 379 (1953).
21 See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super
Markets, 122 F. Supp. 781 (E.D, La. 1954) ; General Electric Co. v. S. Klein-
on-the-Square, Inc., 121 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Frawley Corp. v. Gross-
light, CCI TRADE REG. REP. 67,681 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1954).
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The essential characteristic of resale price maintenance
is the control the manufacturer exercises over the price of
his product after title has passed from him to a vendee who
resells. At common law the courts were divided as to the
legality of resale price maintenance agreements; 22 but where
interstate commerce is affected, they have been illegal under
the Sherman Act ever since the Supreme Court's decision in
the Dr. Miles case in 1911.23
Between 1911 and 1931 several attempts were made to
legalize resale price maintenance agreements, but to no avail.
The depression, however, with its epidemic of cut-rate pricing,
gave impetus to the movement for legalizing minimum resale
prices and, in 1931, California passed the first fair trade law
legalizing such agreements for all trade-marked goods. This
law proved ineffective because it did not prohibit price-
cutting by dealers who were not parties to contracts and, in
1933, California amended her statute to provide that a fair
trade contract established a minimum resale price binding
upon all distributors who had notice of the contract. This
non-signer control feature is the key to the enforcement of
fair trade and the main target for constitutional attacks.
When the United States Supreme Court upheld the non-
signer provisions of the California and the Illinois Acts in
the Old Dearborn 24 and Pep Boys 25 cases in 1936, a nation-
wide movement began which led to the enactment of fair
trade legislation in every state except Missouri, Texas, Ver-
mont and the District of Columbia.
Without the assistance of federal legislation, however,
the Dr. Miles case prevented the full utilization of the state
acts.26 In 1937 Congress sought to lift the ban upon resale
22 See HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 247 (2d ed.
1951).
23 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409
(1911), wherein the Court stated: "The complainant having sold its product
at prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever advantage may
be derived from competition in the subsequent traffic."
24 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183(1936).25 The Pep Boys, Manny, Moe & Jack of Cal., Inc. v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299
U.S. 198 (1936).
26 Under the restricted interpretation of the interstate commerce clause ex-
isting at that time, however, there were many transactions which the state laws
governed.
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price enforcement of the type specified in the various state
laws, when it passed the Miller-Tydings Amendment to Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.2 7  Congress neglected, however,
to exempt non-signer control and in the first Schwegma.n
case 28 the Supreme Court held non-signer enforcement in-
valid under the Sherman Act as to commodities in interstate
commerce.
The damage done by the first Schwegmannn case was,
however, repaired with the enactment of the McGuire Act
Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1952.29
The McGuire Act specifically exempts, under specified
conditions,3" the non-signer provisions from the operation of
the federal anti-trust laws 31 and declares that the enforce-
ment of fair trade rights are not an unlawful burden on
interstate commerce.32
Thus, an effective fair trade program depends upon the
existence of a private contract, a state enforcement statute,
and federal enabling legislation. In the absence of any one
of these elements or without their successful interaction, a
fair trade program constitutes unlawful price fixing.33
III. THU CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS
Prior to the first Schwegmana case and the enactment
of the McGuire Act, the main constitutional attacks upon the
validity of the fair trade laws were: (i) that they deprived
the non-assenting distributor of freedom of contract without
being sufficiently related to the public welfare and thus con-
stituted a violation of due process under the federal and state
2750 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
28 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). For
a provocative discussion of this case see Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State
Action, and the Antitrust Law: Effect of Schweginann Bros. v. Calvert Dis-
tillers Corp., 46 I.L. L. REv. 349 (1951).
2966 STAT. 631, 15 U.S.C. §45 (1952). The fact that the Miller-Tydings
Act was not amended is attributable to the limited jurisdictional authority of
the Interstate Commerce Committee of the House.
30 See note 60 infra.
3166 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45(3) (1952).
3266 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45(4) (1952).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
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constitutions; and (ii) that they constituted an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power to private persons.3 4
The Supreme Court of the United States in the Old
Dearborn case,35 and the highest courts in fifteen states,
found these contentions without merit.3 6 The Supreme Court
of Florida, however, sustained objections to the non-signer
provision based on these contentions and the Supreme Court
of Michigan sustained objections to the same provision based
on the due process argument.3 7
After the enactment of the McGuire Act these attacks
were immediately renewed and the validity of the McGuire
Act itself was drawn into question. The recent cases,3 8 how-
34 The objection was also frequently raised under the federal and state con-
stitutions that the laws discriminated between the producers of identified and
unidentified goods, and thus deprived the producer of the latter of the equal
protection of the laws. This objection was uniformly rejected as insubstantial.
See, e.g., Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S.
183, 197 (1936); Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528
(1939) ; Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, Inc., 10 Wash.2d 372, 116
P.2d 756 (1941). See also Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
Two more limited state constitutional objections which are of contemporary
interest were also raised. These were: (a) that the titles assigned to various
state laws were misleading in that they did not place the legislatures on notice
that non-signers were affected; see 2 CCH TRA"a REG. REP. (9th ed.) 1 7,134
(1953); and (b) that they conflicted with anti-monopoly constitutional pro-
visions. Id. 7,142.
35299 U.S. 183, 191-194 (1936).
36 California: Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal.2d 446, 55 P.2d 177,
aff'd, 299 U.S. 198 (1936) ; Connecticut: Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Johnson
Wholesale Perfume Co., 128 Conn. 596, 24 A.2d 841 (1942) ; Delaware: Klein
v. National Pressure Cooker Co., 64 A.2d 529 (Del. 1949); Illinois: Seagram-
Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2 N.E.2d 940,
aff'd, 299 U.S. 183 (1936) ; Louisiana: Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 200 La.
959, 9 So.2d 303 (1942); Maryland: Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176
Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939) ; Mississippi: W. A. Sheaffer Pen Co. v. Barrett,
209 Miss. 1, 45 So.2d 838 (1950) ; New Jersey: Johnson & Johnson v. Weiss-
bard, 121 N.J. Eq. 585, 191 At. 873 (1937) ; New York: Bourjois Sales Corp.
v. Dorfman, 273 N.Y. 167, 7 N.E.2d 30 (1937); North Carolina: Ely Lilly
& Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939); Oregon,: Borden Co.
v. Schreder, 182 Ore.. 34, 185 P.2d 581, 582 (1947); South Dakota: Miles
Laboratories, Inc. v. Owl Drug Co., 67 S.D. 523, 295 N.W. 292 (1940);
Teniessee: Frankfort Distillers Corp. v. Liberto, 190 Tenn. 478, 230 S.W.2d
971 (1950); Washington: Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, Inc.,
10 Wash.2d 372, 116 P.2d 756 (1941); Wisconsin: Weco Products Co. v. Reed
Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N.W. 426 (1937).
37 Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Sup. Ct.
Fla. 1949) ; Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334
Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952).
38 See notes 2 & 3 supra. Although the Supreme Court recently dismissed sev-
eral similar cases for want of substance, the Lilly-Schwegmann case (109 F.
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ever, have removed any doubt which the first Schwegmann
case may have created as to the continued vitality of Old
Dearborn and indicate that objections to the McGuire Act are
without foundation.
A. The Recent Federal Attack
In the first of the recent cases, the IUlly-Schwegman
case, Schwegmann Brothers challenged the constitutionality
of both the Louisiana Fair Trade Law and the McGuire
Act under the United States Constitution. Eli Lilly and
Company brought suit in the United States District Court
in New Orleans shortly after the enactment of the McGuire
Act to enjoin Schwegmann from selling Lilly products
below fair trade prices established by contracts with other
Louisiana retailers. Although Schwegmann was not a party
to such a contract, the District Court granted Lilly's motion
for summary judgment and issued the permanent injunction
requested.
The defendants' basic position was that in the first
Schwegmann case, the Supreme Court "opened the door" to
a complete re-examination of the due process objections to
the state fair trade acts.
They argued that the decision in the first Schwegmann
case knocked "the props of theory" from under Old Dearborn
rendering that decision "obsolete." In particular, it was
claimed that Old Dearborn did not regard fair trade laws
as "price fixing" statutes or as "coercive" on non-signers but
was premised on the erroneous assumptions that they were
intended for the protection of the manufacturer's good will
in his trade-mark 3 9 and that a non-signer impliedly assents
Supp. 269 [E.D. La.], cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 [1953]) has been singled out
for discussion since (1) the constitutional questions were placed squarely in
issue in this case without the statutory complications present in some of the
more recent cases (e.g., Raxor Corp. v. Goody, 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802
[1954], cert. denied, October Term 1954, no. 324, Oct. 25, 1954 [15 CCH Sup.
Ct. Bull. 33]), and (2) since it has been criticized for applying the fair trade
laws to competitive pricing as distinguished from predatory loss-leader pricing.
See note 51 infra.
39 "The primary aim of the law is to protect the property-namely, the good
will of the producer, which he still owns. The price restriction is adopted as
an appropriate means to that perfectly legitimate end, and not as an end in
[ VOL. 29
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to resale price fixing.40 They further claimed that experience
has shown that the good will theory was at odds with the
realities of the market place and pointed to the rejection of
that theory in several cases. 41  On the other hand, they
pointed out that the Supreme Court characterized fair trade
statutes as involving "coercive price fixing" in the first
Schwegmann case.
In comparing the two opinions, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that it must be borne in mind that Old Dearborn
was dealing with the question of constitutionality, whereas
the first Schwegmann case dealt only with the applicability
of the Miller-Tydings exemption to non-signers. 42  The Court
could find no implication in the first Schwegmann case that
Congressional approval of enforcement against non-signers
would be unconstitutional; on the contrary, it felt that the
implications of the opinion were to the contrary and that
Old Dearborn still controlled.43  Nevertheless, the Court
discussed the merits of the defendants' constitutional
contentions.
itself." Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S.
183, 193 (1936).
For criticisms of Old Dearborn's "good will" theory see Fulda, Resale
Price Maintenance, 21 U. OF CHi. L. Rrv. 175 (1954); Schachtman, Resale
Price Maintenance and the Fair Trade Laws, 11 U. OF Prrr. L. REv. 562, 578
(1950); Rose, Resale Price Maintenance, 3 VAND. L. REv. 24, 36 (1949);
Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and the Law of Restrictive Agreements Affect-
ing Chattels, 49 YALE L.J. 607 (1940).
40 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., supra note 39
at 193-194. Of course, Old Dearborn was dealing with the constitutionality of
fair trade, whereas the first Schweginann case was dealing with the applicability
of Miller-Tydings to non-signers. The Court in Old Dearborn recognized that
the statute "imposed" an obligation on the non-signers who wilfully and know-
ingly disregarded the restrictions on sales of trade-marked articles. Under
such circumstances the Supreme Court said that a non-signer "upon every
principle of fair dealing" could be treated as though he had assented; that so
far as the power of the state was concerned, it was no less constitutional to
bind such a person than to bind one who had consented by signing a contract.
41 See Sunbeam Corp. v. Wenling, 192 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1951). This case,
however, did not involve the interpretation of a fair trade statute. In an earlier
phase of the same case (185 F.2d 903, 905 [3d Cir. 1950]), the court upheld
the constitutionality of the fair trade acts against due process objections while
holding the statute inapplicable to interstate sales.
42 See Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205
F.2d 788, 791 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953).
43 Ibid. See note 45 infra.
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Schwegmann's due process argument was twofold. They
claimed the Louisiana Act violated the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment (i) because it bore no substan-
tial relation to the public welfare but in reality only benefited
retailers and (ii) because it delegated legislative power to
private individuals.
Due Process: Public Welfare
As to Schwegmann's assertion that "fair trade acts are
concerned more with the protection of distributors than with
the protection of the producer or owner of the trade-mark,"
the Court of Appeals said that these "are matters, it seems
to us, for legislative, not for judicial, consideration." 11 The
Court added, "'We have no judicial concern with the economic
and social wisdom of any feature of the law but solely its
constitutionality." 45
The Court of Appeals thus adhered to the doctrine of
the Nebbia case,46 wherein the Supreme Court pointed out
that there was nothing "peculiarly sacrosanct" about price
control:
44 Ibid. The fact that the fair trade laws also benefit retailers and small
businesses generally in addition to protecting the producer's good will would
seem, however, to broaden their constitutional justification under the Nebbia
doctrine. Thus, the state legislative bodies could also have reasonably found
that the public interest generally is served by the fair trade laws on the addi-
tional grounds that they help prevent the growth of monopoly in distribution
and that they discourage deceptive trade practices frequently injurious to the
unwary customer. The many other cases on the point include the following:
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952); Secretary of
Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 619 (1950) ; Carolene
Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1944).
45 In Old Dearborn, the Supreme Court similarly stated: "There is a great
body of fact and opinion tending to show that price cutting by retail dealers
is not only injurious to the good will and business of the producer and dis-
tributor of identified goods, but injurious to the general public as well ...
True, there is evidence, opinion and argument to the contrary; but it does not
concern us to determine where the weight lies. We need say no more than that
the question may be regarded as fairly open to differences of opinion. The
legislation here in question proceeds upon the former and not the latter view;
and the legislative determination in that respect, in the circumstances here dis-
closed, is conclusive so far as this court is concerned. Where the question of
what the facts establish is a fairly-debatable one, we accept and carry into
effect the opinion of the legislature." Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v.
Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 195-196 (1936).
4r Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in
the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote pub-
lic welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such
policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it.
47
The significance of the unanimous holding in Old
Dearborn becomes even greater when it is realized that it
was decided at a time when much state legislation regulating
prices, which today would clearly be held constitutional, had
been stricken down by the Supreme Court under the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the time of Old Dearborn there re-
mained some vitality to the doctrine of the Tyson line of
cases 48 invalidating legislative price fixing. But as the
Supreme Court pointed out in Olsen 'v. NYebraska,4 the Tyson
doctrine was in reality discarded in the Nebbia case. Thus,
"[w]hatever weakening effect on Old Dearborn may have
been caused by Schwegmann's frank characterization of State
fair trade statutes as involving price fixing against non-
signers," said the Court of Appeals, is more than off-set "by
the weakening also of the broad concept against the validity
of legislative price fixing assumed in Old Dearborn." 50
Constitutionality as Applied to Efficient Retailers
The theory on which Lilly elected to try its case against
Schwegmann makes it a particularly strong case for fair
trade. Lilly did not assert in its complaint or affidavits
that the defendants used the plaintiff's products as "loss
leaders." Moreover, Mr. Schwegmann testified, and Lilly did
not rebut, that he made no sales below cost, that his
mark up was uniform on all products and yielded a fair
4 Id. at 537 (emphasis supplied).
4s See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 278 U.S. 235 (1929);
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273
U.S. 418 (1927) ; Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
49313 U.S. 236 (1941).
50 Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d
788, 791 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953). Old Dearborn assumed,
as well settled, "... the right of the owner of property to fix the price at
which he will sell it is an inherent attribute of the property itself and as such
is within the protection of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."
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profit. Thus, the iMly-Schwegmann case put fair trade
to the acid test and held fair trade constitutional even
as applied to an admittedly efficient retailer. This of
course was the acid test for fair trade. The fact that
fair trade, however, makes "no distinction between competi-
tive and predatory price cutting" 51 does not mean that it
is not constitutionally justifiable.
Since the legislative bodies have resolved the economic
and social debate in favor of the fair trade laws, it would
seem that arguments as to the merits of cut-rate pricing in
general, and to Schwegmann's own pricing policies in par-
ticular, were irrelevant in considering constitutionality.
Where a legislative body finds the existence of a general evil
requiring remedial action, it has power to legislate generally.
It is immaterial whether or not all or any of the abuses aimed
at by the statute have been engaged in by the defendant in
a particular case arising under it. 52
Due Process: Delegation
Perhaps the most interesting phase of the Lilly-
Schwegmannu case is the due process delegation issue. In
substance the contention is that the state fair trade laws con-
stitute a delegation of legislative price fixing power to pri-
vate individuals, uncontrollably and without standards, and
are so inherently arbitrary that they cannot be constitutional,
but amount to the taking of defendant's property without
due process of law. This, in the main, is the position of the
dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals. 3
51 See Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. OF CmI. L. RFv. 175, 209
(1954).52 "The contention apparently is that § 11(b) (1) [of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act], as applied to North American, is unconstitutional since
none of the evils that led Congress to enact the statute is present in this in-
stance. But if evils disclosed themselves which entitled Congress to legislate
as it did, Congress had power to legislate generally, unlimited by proof of the
existence of the evils in each particular situation." North American Co. v.
SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 710-711 (1946). Accord, Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v.
Lynch, 226 U.S. 192 (1912); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943) ; Ely Lilly'& Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C.
163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939).
53 While the dissenting judge took the position that the case could be dis-
posed of by dealing only with the Louisiana statute, his concluding paragraph,
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The traditional view of the courts sustaining non-signer
enforcement is that the fair trade laws do not delegate any-
thing.5 4 This seems to be an oversimplification of the prob-
lem as to non-signers. The fact is that one group of private
persons is enabled by the statute to establish a minimum
price requirement which is enforceable by injunction against
a non-signer. As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked, "That cer-
tainly is a delegation of the power to fix prices and to bind
others who have not agreed." 55 But it does not follow that
the state fair trade laws are unconstitutional because there
is a delegation to private personsY6
The difficulty lies with the dogma of the non-delegability
of legislative power which was applied in the Schechter line
of cases.5 7  Many statutes, however, involving a substantial
degree of delegation both to private parties and administra-
tive agencies have been upheld, s and if anything the label
"obsolete," which Schwegmann attached to Old Dearborn, is
however, stated as a reason for invalidating the Louisiana statute that
".. . otherwise the original Sherman Act may be whittled away by legislative
exemptions and exceptions... !' Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v.
Eli Lilly & Co., supra note 50 at 798. It is difficult to see how the Federal
Constitution prevents Congress from amending its own statute.
54 See, e.g., Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299
U.S. 183 (1936); General Electric Co. v. S. Klein-on-the-Square, Inc., 121
N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md.
632, 7 A.2d 176 (1939) ; Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, 121 N.J. Eq. 585,
191 Atl. 873 (1937); Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474,
274 N.W. 426 (1937).
55 See JACXsoN, THaE STRUGGLE FOR JUDicIAL SUPREXACY 164 (1941).
56 For an illuminating discussion of the problem, see HALE, FaREotm
THROUGH LAW 349-382 (1952); Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51
HARv. L. REv. 201 (1937).
57 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) ; Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 491 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935). These cases were all cited in the briefs in the Old
Dearborn case and rejected by the Supreme Court as a basis for holding the
fair trade laws unconstitutional.
58 United States v. Shoreline Apartments, Inc., 338 U.S. 897 (1949) ; Lichter
v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S.
138 (1948); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946);
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) ; Opp Cotton
Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941) ; United States v. Rock Royal
Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939) ; Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) ;
Currin v. Secretary of Agriculture, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); United States v.
Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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more appropriate to the Schechter, Panama and Carter
cases. 59
Be that as it may, the fair trade laws do not give un-
fettered discretion to private individuals to the extent given
in the Schechter line of cases. The Court of Appeals particu-
larly noted that the acts were restricted to trade-marked
goods in fair and open competition and thus the economic
laws of competition "constitute a sufficient restraint against
capricious or arbitrary price-fixing by the producer." 60
Objections to the McGuire Act
Schwegmann also argued that Congress could not consti-
tutionally consent, as it did in the McGuire Act, to the effec-
tive operation of state fair trade laws in so far as they affect
interstate commerce. Such action, they argued, was an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power and was also
precluded by the force of the Commerce Clause. The argu-
ment is insubstantial under the Benjamin line of cases 61
59 As to the Schechter and Panama cases, see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 122 (1942) ; see Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 540 (1944) (dissent-
ing opinion) ("Whether explicitly avowed or not, the present decision over-
rules that in the Schechter case.") ; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 452
(1944) (dissenting opinion). See DAVIs, ADMiNIsRATivF LAw 42, 53 (1951) ;
Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 47 Cor L. REv. 561,
581 (1947) ("Undoubtedly it can be argued that realistically considered
Schechter has been put in the museum of constitutional history.").
As to the doubtful status of the Carter case, see United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381 (1940) (upholding substantially the same Act as was held unconstitutional
in Carter).
60 Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788,
792 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953). The claim that the fair
trade laws lack "standards" or "safeguards" also ignores the following statu-
tory provisions. These define with particularity: (a) the persons against whom
fair trade prices may be enforced (only persons who have contracted to that
effect or persons who have acquired the commodity with full knowledge of the
minimum price restriction and then wilfully and knowingly disregarded it);(b) carefully specified exceptions with respect to closing-out sales, damaged
goods and sales pursuant to court order; and also (c) with respect to prices
established by so-called "horizontal" agreements between producers, between
wholesalers or between retailers.
61 Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). Professor
Dowling very ably analyzes the cases up to 1947, examining all of the com-
peting theories relating to the Commerce Clause, and concludes: "After all-
be its exact theory what it may-congressional consent is an assured doctrine."
Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 Col. L.
RZv. 547, 560 (1947); see Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power,
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and was so treated by the Court of Appeals in the Lilly-
Schwegmann case.62
B. The Recent State Attacks
The emphasis of the opponents of fair trade in the recent
cases, as noted above, has shifted somewhat to include a
state-by-state attack. In many of the recent cases they have
argued that the state acts are only applicable to intrastate
commerce in the absence of re-enactment of the state act.
This argument has been successfully coupled with the state
due process and delegation arguments in the Arkansas and
Nebraska decisions 63 and is the outgrowth of Gr-ayson-
Robinson Stores. Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd. 4
In the Oneida case the Supreme Court of Georgia held
that since the non-signer provision in the Georgia Act was
invalid as to interstate transactions when enacted in 1936,65
it remained ineffective as to these transactions (in spite of
the passage of the McGuire Act) until re-enacted.
The recent New York, New Jersey and Louisiana cases 6
have rejected the argument as metaphysical and have taken
the view that re-enactment is not necessary. The theory of
these cases is that the state law was an unqualified exercise
of the state's police power with respect to retail sales within
the state, but that the full effectiveness of this exercise of
27 VA. L. Rlv. 1 (1940); Koenig, Federal and State Cooperation Under the
Constitution, 36 MIcH. L. REv. 752 (1938); Legis., 27 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 379,
395-400 (1953).
62 Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., snpra note
60 at 792-793; cf. Raxor Corp. v. Goody, 307 N.Y. 229, 240, 120 N.E.2d 802, 805,
cert. denied, October Term 1954, no. 324, Oct. 25, 1954 (15 CCH Sup. Ct. Bull.
33), wherein the petitioner sought to distinguish between the sale of goods
affecting, and sales directly in, interstate commerce.
63 See notes 12, 13 supra.
64209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E.2d 161 (1953). A similar argument was made in the
petition for certiorari in the Lilly-Schwegmnann case, but as pointed out in Elgin
Nat. Watch Co. v. Barrett, 213 F.2d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 1954), the issue is a
state one. Cf. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 729
(1944) (as bearing on the necessity of re-executing contracts in existence since
before the enactment of the McGuire Act).
65 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
68 See notes 5, 6, 7 mtpra. See also General Electric Co. v. Packard Bam-
berger & Co., 14 N.J. 209, 102 A.2d 18 (1953).
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police power was impeded by the federal antitrust laws until
they were amended by the McGuire Act.
The problem is not new and seems to be one in which
prior local precedents will play an important part.06
The opponents of fair trade have also sought to upset
fair trade by renewing their attacks on the titles assigned
to various state acts as being misleading in that they did not
put the legislatures on notice that non-signers were affected.
This attack succeeded in Nebraska 68 although there is
authority to the contrary, particularly where the act in ques-
tion has been re-enacted.6 9
The principal basis for attacking fair trade legislation,
however, continues to be the state due process argument.7 0
The Supreme Courts in Florida 71 and Michigan,7 2 as well
as in Georgia,73 have in general adhered to the "affected with
the public interest" doctrine 74 (long since overruled as to
the Federal Constitution in the Nebbia case),75 in holding
their state non-signer provisions unconstitutional.
On the other hand, the courts upholding the constitu-
tionality of the various state acts stress the principle of the
finality of the legislative decision on questions of economic
and social wisdom. 70
6 See Note, The Effect of Declaring a Statute Unconstitutional, 29 Co. L.
REv. 1140, 1146-1148 (1929).
68 See note 13 mcpra.
692 CCH TRADE RE. REP. (9th ed.) 117,134 (1952). If the Nebraska case
is upheld on appeal it will render fair trade unenforceable against signers as
well as non-signers in that jurisdiction. The claim that the fair trade laws
are invalid under local constitutional provisions relating to monopolies has
not as yet been renewed.
70 While the delegation issue has been interspersed with the due process
arguments (see, e.g., Miles Laboratories v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680 [Fla. 1954];
General Electric Co. v. Brandeis & Sons, CCH TRADE REG. REP. 167,682
[Neb. D. Ct. 1954] ), actually it is a separate constitutional issue in the states
(General Electric Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 302 [1954])
and perhaps a more substantial one than under Article I of the Federal Con-
stitution. See DAvIs, ADMINISTRAIVE LAW 61-64 (1951).
71 See notes 10 and 37 srpra.
72 See note 37 supra.
73 See note 11 supra.
74 See, e.g., Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Sporting Goods Co., 334
Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952). "The business in question is not affected
with a public interest. . - ." Id., 54 N.W.2d at 271.
75 See note 33 supra.
76 See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d
302 (1954).
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While it is true that state courts are entitled to their
own standard of public welfare in applying their own consti-
tutional provisions, the federal experience indicates that de-
cisions as to the economic and social wisdom of a statute are
best left to the legislative process.
7 7
IV. STATUTORY PROBLEMS
It is not necessary to upset the constitutional basis for
fair trade to render it ineffective. As long as interstate com-
merce is affected, as noted above, fair trade is merely a
specific exemption from the anti-trust laws and a manufac-
turer must be careful to comply with both the terms of the
McGuire Act and the state fair trade law at the place of re-
sale. Thus, if a manufacturer of wearing apparel attempts to
fair trade in Virginia he is engaged in illegal price fixing
since clothing cannot be fair traded in that State.78 The
problem is further illustrated by the case of the integrated
manufacturer-retailer or wholesaler.7 9
On the other hand, there are other statutory problems
which arise primarily as defenses in enforcement proceed-
ings and which are not likely to give rise to illegal price fix-
ing charges. These involve, for example, the applicability of
the state and federal statutes to interstate mail order sales,
to indirect price-cutting devices (such as trading stamps),
and to other situations.
77 Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246-247 (1941).
78 VA. CODE ANN. tit. 59, §§ 59-2, 59-20 (1949). Similarly the producer's
or owner's trade-mark must be registered in the United States Patent Office
if he wishes to fair trade in Kansas. See CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.)
13,200 (1954).
79 The applicability of the horizontal prohibitions of the state and federal
acts to such manufacturer is the subject of litigation now pending before the
Federal Trade Commission and the federal and state courts. Doubleday & Co.,
3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. Docket No. 5897 (F.T.C. 1954), inotion, to dismiss
the complaint granted, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (9th ed.) 7f 11,359, rev'd, 11,515
(F.T.C. 1953). See Eastman Kodak Co., 3 CCII TRADE REG. REP. Doc.
No. 6040 (F.T.C. 1954), motion to dismiss denied, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
(9th ed.) 1 11,527 (initial decision dismissing complaint after trial before hear-
ing examiner, id., 1 11,731) (F.T.C. 1954); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Aljan Cam-
era Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 167,770 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1954) (judgment for
plaintiff after trial) ; United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 122 F. Supp.
333 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment denied.). See
54 Coi. L. REv. 282 (1954); 67 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1954).
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Mail Order Sales
Ever since the Wentling case,80 the problem of interstate
mail order sales has been a potential Achilles' heel to the
fair trader.
In the Wentling case the court held that the Pennsyl-
vania Fair Trade Act could not be enforced against inter-
state sales by a non-assenting Pennsylvania mail order
house. Judge Goodrich held that the practical effect of
fair trade pricing in such a situation constituted a burden
on interstate commerce. Thus, he reasoned, if a local
mail order house was required to abide by fair trade prices
whereas its competitors in non-fair trade jurisdictions were
not, or could sell at a lower fair trade price for the same
article, interstate sales by the local seller would be restrained.
Section 4 of the McGuire Act 81 was designed to alter
the legal effect of the 1Wentling case. 2  Assuming that under
this section the state laws may be constitutionally applied to
interstate transactions, 3 what is the precise effect of the
state fair trade laws? 84
No serious problem arises when the mail order house
and the buyer are located in different fair trade jurisdic-
tions.8 5 The difficult situation is where the seller is located
in a non-fair trade state and sells to a buyer in a fair trade
state. It has been claimed that such a seller is beyond the
80 Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 341 U.S. 944 (1951). Raxor Corp. v. Goody, 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d
802 (1954), cert. denied, October Term 1954, Oct. 25, 1954 (15 CCH Sup. Ct.
Bull. 33), raised the same problem as Wentling after the enactment of the
McGuire Act.
81 "Neither the making of contracts or agreements as described in paragraph
(2) of this subsection, nor the exercise or enforcement of any right or right
of action [against non-signers] as described in paragraph (3) of the subsection
shall constitute an unlawful burden or restraint upon, or interference with,
commerce." 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45(4) (1952).8 2 H.R. REP. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952).
83 See notes 61 and 62 sapra. See also United States v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 304 (1953); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728
(1949).
84 "It is sufficient here to say that, from its preamble and its terms, the Act
does not leave Masters of Washington free from the consequences of its acts
done in New York in violation of New York's law." General Electric Co. v.
Masters Mail Order Co., 122 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. N.Y. 1954). Accord, Sunbeam
Corp. v. Masters, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
85 See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. MacMillan, 110 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1953).
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reach of the fair trade laws and is in a position to make very
profitable forays into fair trade areas.8 6  If the seller ar-
ranges his sales so that title passes in the non-fair trade jur-
isdiction, this would, at first blush, seem to be true. The
difficulty, however, is that the mail order house must inform
its prospective purchasers of its lower prices, that is, it must
advertise in a fair trade jurisdiction. This is the source of
the mail order house's difficulty since the typical fair trade
statute provides that it is unlawful to wilfully or knowingly
advertise, offer for sale or sell at less than the fair trade
prices.8 7
Several jurisdictional problems complicate the picture
at this point. It is doubtful whether advertising of itself is
a sufficient basis for the service of process.8 8  Thus, if the
mail order house in a non-fair trade state carefully polices
its extraterritorial activities and merely advertises in a fair
trade jurisdiction, the manufacturer will probably have to
proceed against it at its principal place of business, probably
a non-fair trade state.8 9 The problem then is whether the
non-fair trade jurisdiction is required to give full faith and
credit to the fair trade jurisdiction's law. Although the prob-
lem has not as yet been litigated in a fair trade context, it
should not be overlooked that the Constitution 10 and the
Congressional Amendment to the Full Faith and Credit
Implementing Act in 1948 91 apply to the statutes as well as
judicial proceedings of every other state.
86 See Rahl, Fair Trade Since the McGuire Amendment in LEcTuREs ON
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (U. of Mich. Law School 1953).
87 1 CCH TRADz REG. REP. (10th ed.) U 3252 (1954).
88 Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 119 N.Y.S.2d 729, 733-
734 (Sup. Ct. 1953); McGriff v. Charles Antell, 256 P.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. Utah
1953).
8 See note 84 supra.
90 U.S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
91 62 STAT. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952). Cf. Wells v. Simonds
Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953) ; First Nat. Bank v. United Air Lines, 342
U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Green v. Van
Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139 (U.S. 1868); Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307 (U.S.
1866).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Indirect Price-Cutting
In their efforts to avoid the impact of the fair trade laws,
distributors are increasingly employing the use of trading
stamps redeemable in merchandise, combination sales of fair
trade and other articles at a price slightly above the fair
trade minimum, give-aways, trade-in allowances, and gifts
to the customer's favorite charity in connection with the sale
of fair traded articles.9 2  They have also resorted to selling
new merchandise as second hand floor models 11 and are re-
ported as having abused the close-out sale exemption.9 4
The use of these so-called indirect price-cutting devices
is particularly important in terms of the manufacturer's ob-
ligation to follow a consistent policy of enforcement. If the
manufacturer permits distributors to utilize indirect methods
of reducing fair trade prices he may subsequently be charged
with having abandoned his fair trade structure.9 5 It there-
fore is incumbent upon the manufacturer affirmatively to
curtail particular indirect price-cutting practices when they
are within the meaning of the local fair trade act, or make
the practice uniformly available to all distributors.
In twenty states where the fair trade acts expressly for-
bid gifts, coupons and combination sales "except to the ex-
tent authorized by contract," 96 the problem is not serious.
In these jurisdictions the manufacturer can uniformly permit
the use of these devices without worrying about abandoning
92 See note 18 supra. Cases illustrative of these practices are: Sunbeam
Corp. v. Baumgarten, 93 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. N.Y. 1950) (trade-in allowances) ;
Sunbeam Corp. v. Phillips, CCH TRADE CASES 1162,686 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1950)
(charity gifts) ; Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, CCH TRADE REG. REP.
(10th ed.) 167,747 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1954) (trading stamps); E. R. Squibb &
Sons v. Charline's Cut Rate, Inc., 9 N.J. Super. 328, 74 A.2d 354 (1950)
(give-aways) ; Magazine Repeating Razor Co. v. Weissbard, 125 N.J. Eq. 593,
7 A.2d 411 (1939) (combination sales).
93 See Empire State Camera Exchange v. Reynolds, Inc., 194 Misc. 301,
88 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
94 See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Windsor-Fifth Avenue, Inc., 14 N.J. 222, 102
A.2d 25 (1953), 67 HARv. L. REv. 1263 (1954).
95 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Charles Appliances, Inc., CCH TRADE
REG. RaP. (10th ed.) f111 67,685 and 67,838 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1954) ; Frank Fisher
Merchandising Corp. v. Ritz Drug Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 105, 19 A.2d 454 (1941) ;
Bathasweet Corp. v. Weissbard, 129 N.J. Eq. 135, 15 A.2d 337 (1940) ; Maga-
zine Repeating Razor Co. v. Weissbard, sz'ria note 92.
96 See tabulation in CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) ff 3008 (1954).
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its fair trade structure or it can institute legal proceedings,
if necessary, with a reasonable expectation that it will be
able to enjoin their continued use without undue expense.9
The manufacturer's problem is serious, however, in those
states in which the fair trade acts do not contain any "anti-
concession" provisions." Its first problem is whether or not
the various indirect price-cutting devices fall within the pro-
hibitions of the local fair trade act. If it is fair trading in
California 99 and Pennsylvania 0 0 it may safely assume that
the granting of trading stamps with the purchase of fair trade
merchandise, for example, is not considered a fair trade vio-
lation. 10 1 On the other hand, in New York the practice has
been held illegal even in the absence of an express statutory
prohibition. 0 2 But what of the other jurisdictions? The re-
sult of course will depend to a great extent on whether the
local courts will follow the reasoning of the New York or the
California trading stamp cases. But it may also depend to
a large extent on the context in which the issue is litigated.
For example, if a defendant raises the defense that the manu-
facturer has abandoned its fair trade program by indiscrim-
inately allowing indirect price cutting to continue, there may
be a temptation to hold that the local fair trade act is not ap-
plicable to the practice in question. 0 3
In view of the sparseness of judicial precedent as to the
various indirect devices, the manufacturer's problem is fur-
ther aggravated in the states without the "anti-concession"
97 Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Roberts Bros., CCH TRADE CASES 162,669
(Cir. Ct. Ore.), rev'd on other grounds, 192 Ore. 23, 233 P.2d 258 (1950);
see Ed. Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, 237 Wis. 41, 295 N.W. 737, 743 (1941).
Os See note 96 supra.
99 Food & Grocery Bureau v. Garfield, 20 Cal.2d 228, 125 P.2d 3 (1942).
100 See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939).
101 Cf. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th
ed.) 167,747 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1954).
102 Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950).
103 Recent cases indicate, however, that manufacturers can provide for uni-
form exemptions without abandoning fair trade in states without the "anti-
concession" provisions either tacitly (see Frawley Corp. v. Grosslight, CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 167,681 [Super. Ct. Cal. 1954]) or expressly (see General
Electric Co. v. S. Klein-on-the-Square, Inc., 121 N.Y.S.2d 37 [Sup. Ct. 1953]).
But see Frank Fisher Merchandising Corp. v. Ritz Drug Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 105,
19 A.2d 454 (1941); Bathasweet Corp. v. Weissbard, 129 N.J. Eq. 135, 15
A.2d 337 (1940); Magazine Repeating Razor Co. v. Weissbard, 125 N.J. Eq.
593, 7 A2d 411 (1939).
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provision since he will have a difficult time inducing volun-
tary compliance. If he chooses to prohibit particular indirect
price-cutting practices he will have to sue without assurance
of success. Furthermore, in view of the multitude of in-
direct price-cutting devices an enforcement program would be
rather expensive.
Problems Arising Out of the Klein Case
We have examined a few of the more important statu-
tory problems of fair trade, and turn now to the examination
of a specific case to illustrate other statutory problems and
to raise a more pervasive problem which every manufacturer
must inevitably face, that is, keeping the cost of enforcement
within feasible limits. This problem is raised particularly
well by the recent Klein case. 104
Once a manufacturer decides to fair trade it is his duty
to enforce his fair trade structure. Experience demonstrates
that this is no easy matter. Within sixteen months after the
enactment of the McGuire Act, General Electric, for example,
found it necessary to file over 145 complaints in 48 cities in
13 states.'0 5 The first of these cases which went to trial in
New York was the Klein case where General Electric was
confronted with sixteen separate defenses.
In spite of the plaintiff's huge financial outlays expended
in attempting to enforce its fair trade prices, foremost among
the defendant's defenses was the allegation that the plaintiff
forfeited any right to injunctive relief because it had been
lax or negligent in its enforcement efforts.' 6
104 General Electric Co. v. S. Klein-on-the-Square, Inc., supra note 103.
105 See Walton, Fair Trade Can Be Enforced, PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN
FAIR TRADE COUNCIL 15 (Nov. 17, 1953).
100 The defendant in the Klein case also raised the following statutory
defenses:
(1) The plaintiff's contracts did not comply with the New York Fair
Trade Act in that they did not: (a) constitute "valid contracts" under
New York law or within the meaning of the statute, (b) provide that
the distributor was required to sell at a price "stipulated" by the
plaintiff, and (c) contemplate the maintenance of uniform prices on
retail sales to ultimate consumers in New York;
(2) The plaintiff's agreements were not contracts or agreements prescribing
minimum or stipulated prices within the meaning of the McGuire Act;
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Although the Court found that the plaintiff had followed
a consistent and non-discriminatory policy of enforcement,
much of the extensive evidence introduced at the trial
was directed to this issue undoubtedly to the plaintiff's
discomfort.
The manufacturer's burden does not end with injunc-
tive relief in his favor; however, he must still police his in-
junctions. Thus, General Electric felt compelled to institute
eleven contempt actions within the same sixteen months
period referred to above.'0 7
Another recent case raises the question of whether or
not the injunctions obtained against price cutters are en-
forceable in contempt actions in the federal courts. In the
Hoff miaz.-Lakoche case 108 the plaintiff brought a contempt
proceeding arising out of the defendant's sale of packaged
prescription products below prevailing fair trade prices.
Although the Court rejected the defendant's claim that
the manufacturer's good will is not involved in retail drug
transactions where the doctor specifies a brand name ' 0 9 and
where the label is removed at the time of the sale, the Court
refused to hold the defendant in contempt because the in-
junction referred to prevailing prices. The Court found that
Federal Rule 65 (d) requires every order granting an injunc-
tion to be specific in terms and describe in reasonable detail,
(3) The defendant purchased the merchandise in question before it had
knowledge of the existence of a fair trade price on the merchandise;
(4) The plaintiff's appliances were not in fair and open competition with
similar appliances of other manufacturers;
(5) The plaintiff failed to allege or show irreparable damage;
(6) The plaintiff has failed to fair trade all of its products bearing its
trade-marked name;
(7) The plaintiff's agreements were unlawful because they were part of a
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman and Robinson Patman Acts.
107 Walton, op. cit. supra note 105. Furthermore, in 1948 G.E. obtained in-
junctions against ten price cutters and subsequently eight of these were ad-
judged in contempt which resulted in $650 in fines. See Bercher, Discount
Houses, 14 CONSUAmER REP. 420 (1949).108 Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets,
122 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1954).
109 The case is the first definitive ruling on fair trade and prescription prod-
ucts but it leaves the problem of compounded items still unresolved.
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",and not by reference to the complaint or other document,
the act or acts sought to be restrained." "I
Prior to this case it was customary to provide in the
injunction that the defendant could not sell at prices lower
than those fixed by prevailing fair trade contracts,"' it being
of course implied that the defendant was to be given notice of
changes in price. The Hoffmann-LaRoche decision is ap-
parently the first case to hold this type of injunction un-
enforceable in the federal courts. The decision apparently
requires the defendant to move to amend its injunctions
every time it changes its fair trade price for a particular
product. Since many manufacturers fair trade thousands of
items, this decision if upheld will make the manufacturer's
lot an even more burdensome one.
V. CONCLUSION
Fair trade is a controversial field beset with many legal
and non-legal problems. It is also an area in which the
losers die hard, whether they are fair traders in Florida or
the opponents of fair trade in New York. It therefore is un-
likely that the volume of litigation in this field will greatly
diminish in the near future. The economic motivations, for
example, which have led the opponents of fair trade to attack
the constitutionality of the New York legislation in the Court
of Appeals on seven separate occasions will undoubtedly lead
to a series of new or renewed litigations in other jurisdictions.
110 See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets,
supra note 108 at 788. Rule 65(d), unfortunately, was not argued or briefed
and the cases which the court relied upon seem to be inapplicable to the situ-
ation and the decision in essence must rest on a literal reading of Rule 65(d).
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 410 (1945), holds that
Rule 65(d) prohibits the enjoining of violations "as charged in the complaint";
Russell C. House Transfer & Storage Co. v. United States, 189 F.2d 349 (5th
Cir. 1951), holds that a court has no power to enjoin generally all violations
of the Interstate Commerce Act; Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corp., 182 F.2d
800 (3d Cir. 1950), holds that Rule 65(d) requires that the court assign reasons
for granting an injunction. Bit see Iowa Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. May's Drug
Stores, Inc., 229 Iowa 554, 294 N.W. 756 (1940), criticized in 54 HARv. L. REv.
1068 (1941). The court's decision also casts doubt as to the validity of in-
junctions obtained under OPA and similar legislation.
III See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters, Inc., CCH TADE RFG. REP. f167,841
(S.D. N.Y. 1954). In an early phase of this proceeding Sunbean obtained a
$16,000 contempt award under precisely the form of injunction held unenforce-
able in the Hofftmanm-La Roche case.
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